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ARTICLE 
UNBEARABLE? 
BITTERROOT GRIZZLY BEAR 
REINTRODUCTION & THE GEORGE W. 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
ROB ROY SMITH· 
In the early 1990s, a unique coalition of environmentalists, labor un-
ions, timber industry executives and wildlife biologists put aside their 
philosophical differences to craft a plan to reintroduce the grizzly bear to 
the remote wilderness mountains of the Bitterroot Ecosystem along the 
IdaholMontana border. They drafted a plan that called for the creation of 
a Citizen Management Committee, a locally-controlled, citizen driven 
management authority to oversee the day-to-day management of the rein-
troduced bears. The Citizen Management Committee was heralded as a 
success across the country and could have ushered in a new era of envi-
ronmental politics, but for the 2000 Presidential election. This article 
discusses the collaborative approach used to formulate the grizzly bear 
plan, explores why it failed to win the support of the state of Idaho and 
the Bush Administration, and seeks answers to the future of species 
reintroduction under the Bush Doctrine. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With America focused on the Bush Administration's war on terror-
ism and Middle East policy, many of us have forgotten about the issues 
that captured our minds and imaginations in the pre-September 11th 
world. While domestic policy has seemingly taken a backseat to Amer-
ica's foreign relations and the diversion of funds away from traditional 
domestic programs and towards homeland defense, the Bush Administra-
tion's Department of the Interior ("Interior Department") has consistently 
and aggressively implemented a policy placing local controls and local 
• Mr. Smith is an associate attorney with the law firm of Morisset, Schlosser, Homer, Joz-
wiak & McGaw in Seattle, Washington. The firm is engaged in the practice of Indian law and 
represents Indian tribes and organizations across the country. Previously, Mr. Smith was a Staff 
Attorneyl Policy Analyst with the Nez Perce Tribe in Lapwai, Idaho where his practice focused on 
Indian gaming, taxation, natural resources, and intergovernmental affairs. He is a 2000 cum laude 
graduate of Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon where he 
graduated with a Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law and was the winner of the 
law school's Natural Resources Leadership Award. The opinions expressed in this article do not 
necessarily reflect on those of Morisset, Schlosser, Homer, Jozwaik & McGaw. 
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decision-making over the interests of sensitive habitat and species pro-
tection. 
The Bush Administration's push for more local control of species 
and natural resource policy-making has been defended on states' rights 
grounds and the need to move away from the "federally" initiated poli-
cies of the Clinton Administration. l However, there existed one Clinton-
era policy that seemed to capture the ideals of the Bush Administration's 
environmental policy. The plan had it all - citizen control; local deci-
sion-making by a broad coalition of environmentalists, governmental 
agencies, a tribal government, timber and other industry representatives; 
and widespread national support - except for the support of the Gover-
nor of Idaho and Bush's Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton.2 After 
years of heated debate and numerous public hearings across the inter-
mountain West and on Capitol Hill, and a little known lawsuit filed by 
the State of Idaho in January 2001, the Bush Administration and Secre-
tary Norton made their fIrst major wildlife decision since taking offIce by 
taking aim at this seemingly Bush-friendly plan. Secretary Norton ig-
nored the conclusions U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service scientists and 
abandoned her predecessor's decision to reintroduce a small experimen-
tal population of grizzly bears in the Selway-Bitterroot Ecosystem in 
central Idaho and western Montana in favor of an offIcial position on "no 
action.,,3 As a result, a proposal that reflected a radical departure from 
the kind of heavy-handed federally driven approaches that had subjected 
the Endangered Species Act to strong criticism had succumbed to a new 
form of heavy-handed Washington, D.C. pressure. 
In the year and half since the Secretary's decision to shelve the griz-
zly bear recovery plan, the Bush Administration has faced growing criti-
cism for rolling back numerous environmental protections.4 However, 
almost a year and a half later, the future of the grizzly bear in the United 
States remains in limbo. 5 
This article begins by providing a brief overview of the history of 
the grizzly bear reintroduction efforts and the Clinton Administration's 
I See 2000 Republic Party Platfonn, available at :www.mc.orgiGOPlnfo/ Platfonnl20001 
platfonn6.html (last visited Feb. 10,2003). 
2 See infra Sec. III.C. 
3 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Establishment of a Nonessential Experi-
mental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofIdaho and Montana; Removal ofRegu-
lations, 66 Fed. Reg. 33620-22 (June 22, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). See infra notes 
22-23 and accompanying text. 
4 Natural Resources Defense Center, Rewriting the Rules. Year End Report 2002. available 
at www.nrdc.orgllegislationlrollbacks/execsum.asp(lastused Feb 10,2003). 
5 See Bush Administration Pushing to Life Grizzly bear Protections (Jan. 5, 2003), available 
at www.nrdc.org/bushrecordl2003-Ol.asp#1224 (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (noting that the Bush 
Administration may seek to remove the grizzly bears from the endangered species list later this 
year). 
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decision to move forward with plans to secure an experimental popula-
tion of the threatened species in the remote wilderness of Idaho and 
Montana. Section III focuses on local reaction to the decision to reintro-
duce the grizzly bear, and in particular, the strong rhetoric of the Idaho 
congressional delegation opposing the reintroduction. Section IV brings 
new light on the subsequent legal challenge brought by Governor Dirk 
Kempthorne and the Republican legislative leadership of the State of 
Idaho to bar the grizzly bear reintroduction. Section V discusses Secre-
tary Norton's decision to adopt the "no action" alternative and substitute 
"best politics" for the "best available science." This section also reviews 
the public's overwhelmingly negative response to the Secretary's deci-
sion, paying particular attention to the comments of the framers of the 
citizen-driven reintroduction alternative and the Nez Perce Tribe ("Nez 
Perce" or "Tribe"). Section VI looks towards the future of grizzly bear 
recovery and other species reintroduction programs under the Endan-
gered Species Act and the potential for litigation to force the Administra-
tion to take action on the grizzly bear plan. Finally, this article concludes 
that the Secretary Norton's decision to acquiesce to the will of a state 
Governor in the face of conclusive scientific evidence to the contrary 
signals an uncertain future for species reintroduction and the Endangered 
Species Act under the Bush Administration. 
II. THE PURPOSE AND NEED FOR GRIZZLY REINTRODUCTION 
Prior to European colonization, more than 50,000 grizzly bears (Ur-
sus arc/os horribilis) roamed the western United States.6 However, due 
in large part to diminished habitat and excessive human-caused morality, 
approximately only 800-1,000 bears remain scattered among different 
isolated populations in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and Washington. 7 
This represents less than two percent of the bear's original range.8 
6 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Proposed Establishment of a Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofIdaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg. 
35763 (July 2, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pI. 17). See also H. Josef Hebert, Associated Press, 
Unbearable?, Nov. 17, 2000, available at www.abcnews.go.comlsections/uslDaily Newslgriz-
zlyO01117. html (based on U.S. Fish and Wildlife 1993 estimates) (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). 
7 U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Summary of the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Grizzly 
Bear Recovery in the Bitterroot Ecosystem at 2 (March 2000) (hereinafter FEIS Summary). 
8 G. Sidney Silliman, Norton Should Endorse Bitterroot Grizzly Bear Reintroduction, avail-
able at www.csupomona.edul.gssillimanlpublications.html(last visited Dec, 29, 2002). 
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A. REINTRODUCTION IN THE SELWAy-BITTERROOT ECOSYSTEM 
Not surprisingly, the natural history of the grizzly bear and their 
ecological role was poorly understood during Western settlement, and 
the bear was eradicated along with other large predators because they 
were seen as a threat to humans, and later to livestock.9 Ironically, al-
though the grizzly is an omnivore, the bear's diet consists of about ninety 
percent vegetation and insect matter. to Nevertheless, fear of the un-
known drove the extirpation of the grizzly. II The last verified death of a 
grizzly in the Bitterroot Mountains occurred in 1932, and the last tracks 
were observed in 1946. 12 No verified signs or tracking of grizzlies have 
occurred in the Bitterroot Ecosystem in more than fifty years.13 Based on 
the rapid decline of grizzly bear populations across the West, the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") listed the bear as a threatened species 
under the federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in the lower forty-
eight states in 1975. 14 
With this action, the FWS took responsibility for protecting the 
grizzly bear,15 and in 1982 the FWS finalized the Grizzly Bear Recovery 
Plan that called for the evaluation of 5,785 square mile l6 Selway-
9 The bears were also killed for sport and for their fur. Conservative estimates indicate that 
trappers ki1\ed twenty-five to forty grizzly bears annually in the Bitterroot Mountains alone. U.S. 
Dep't of the Interior, Record of Decision and Statement of Findings for the Environmental Impact 
Statement on Grizzly Bear Recovery in the Bitterroot Ecosystem and Final Rule on Establishment of 
a Nonessential Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area of Idaho and Mon-
tana at Final Rule -3 (Nov. 2000) (hereinafter ROD and Final Rule). A ROD is a necessary docu-
ment in the agency's decision making process under the National Environmental Policy Act which 
identifies an alternatives considered by the agency in reaching its decision, all issues and factors 
considering in reaching its decision, and states whether a1\ practicable means have been used to 
avoid and minimize environmental harm from the selected alternative. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 
(2002). 
10 U.S. Fish an Wildlife Service, Grizzly Bear Recovery, March 9, 2000, available at 
www.r6.fws.gov/endspp/grizzlylbitterq&a.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2002) (hereinafter Grizzly Bear 
Recovery). 
\I !d. 
12 [d. 
13 [d. 
14 Amendment Listing the Grizzly Bear of the 48 Conterminous States as a Threatened Spe-
cies, 40 Fed. Reg. 31734 (1975). A threatened species is defined as "any species ... likely to be-
come ... endangered ... within the foreseeable future throughout an or a significant portion of its 
range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (2002). 
15 The ESA mandates that the agency take proactive steps to conserve the species and eco-
systems upon which they depend. See generally 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. The ESA defines "conser-
vation" as the "use of all methods and procedures ... necessary to bring any endangered or threat-
ened species to the point at which measures provided" under the ESA are no longer needed. [d. § 
1532(3). The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the ESA "indicates beyond a doubt, that Congress 
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." Tennessee VaUey Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (\978). 
16 The Selway-Bitterroot is aU federally owned land. See FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 10. 
In addition, to the 4 million acre Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, adjacent to the Bitterroot Ecosystem 
is the 4 million acre Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness. ld. An addition 13 minion acres 
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Bitterroot Ecosystem as a potential recovery area for the species. 17 The 
Selway-Bitterroot Ecosystem was chosen as a potential recovery area for 
a number of reasons. Historically, the choice for this particular ecosys-
tem is clear. The grizzly bear was a widespread inhabitant of the Bitter-
root Mountains in central Idaho and western Montana, and were common 
in Idaho until the early 1900S.18 The Bitterroots are also a remote, vast 
wilderness, where the potential for human-bear interaction would be 
minimal, and an ample food supply exists for the bears.19 But more im-
portant than simply historical range, biologists determined that the Bitter-
root Ecosystem could play a pivotal role in the eventual recovery of the 
bear throughout the West. In addition to having a carrying capacity of 
more than three hundred grizzly bears, thereby increasing the current 
number of grizzlies in the contiguous United States by twenty-five to 
thirty percent, the establishment of a third population group in the Bitter-
roots would bridge the gap between the two existing populations of bears 
(one to the East in Yellowstone National Park and the other to the north 
in the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystems).2o This would allow the 
three populations to eventually interact, contributing significantly to the 
long-term recovery of the grizzly bear by creating a viable grizzly popu-
lation which spans the Idaho-Montana border.21 
Finally, eleven years after the Recovery Plan was formulated, the 
Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee22 ("IGBC") endorsed the decision 
to use the Bitterroot Ecosystem as a potential recovery area, initiating 
federal planning for recovery and freeing appropriation dollars for the 
of national forest land surround the wilderness area. National Wildlife Federation, Reintroducing 
Grizzly Bears to the Bitterroot Ecosystem, available at www.nwf.orgigrizzlylbitterro.html(last 
visited Dec. 29,2002). See FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 10. 
17 ROD and Final Rule, supra note 4. The Recovery Area was significantly smaller than the 
eventually chosen "experimental population area" which compromised 16.1 million acres. Only 
bears in the Recovery area were to be managed by the Proposed Rule. A special rule was to be 
crafted for the experimental area. See Final Rule and ROD Questions and Answers - Nov. 2000 at 
3. 
IB Grizzly Bear Recovery, supra note 6. 
19 Id. The Bitterroot ecosystem is one of the largest contiguous blocks of federal land re-
maining in the lower 48 states. Id. The core of the ecosystem is comprised of a wilderness area 
which makes up the largest block of wilderness habitat in the Rocky Mountains south of Canada. Id. 
Six different studies were conducted, and each confirmed that the bear could thrive in the habitat as a 
wide variety of seasonal foods, including berries, forbs and grasses, and high levels of ungulates and 
carrion exists in the Bitterroot Ecosystem. Id. 
2°Id. 
21 Id. Bear populations are most vulnerable when confined to small geographic areas that are 
genetically and geographically isolated from each other. FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 2. Biolo-
gists believe that if no new genes are introduced to the Yellowstone grizzly population within three 
to four generations, the bears could suffer from inbreeding. Associated Press, Biologist says Yellow-
stone Grizzlies Will Suffer Without Reintroduction Plans, Lewiston Morning Tribune, July, 16,2001. 
22 The Fish and Wildlife Service have described the IGBC as a "group of high level adminis-
trators that represent the federal and state agencies and coordinate agency efforts in implementing" 
grizzly bear recovery plans. FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 2. 
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necessary scientific and environmental studies.23 A technical working 
group comprised of scientists and a local citizen group was formed, and 
in December 1993, the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee convened a 
hearing in Denver, Colorado to bring all interested parties to the table to 
discuss the possibility of reintroducing grizzly bears to the public lands 
of central Idaho and formulating an Environmental Impact Statement 
("EIS") to make the idea a reality.24 Although many at the meeting ex-
pressed opposition to brining the bears back to Idaho, one timber indus-
try representative expressed a sentiment which opened the door for a 
unique collaborative process to begin, stating that if the bears were going 
to be introduced, the industry wanted a voice in how it was going to be 
done. 25 
B. UNIQUE-COLLABORATIVE PROCESS FOR REINTRODUCTION IS BORN 
In 1995, the FWS formed an interagency team to prepare the EIS. 
This team consisted of a number of diverse stakeholders from across 
Idaho and Montana including representatives from the FWS, U.S. Forest 
Service, Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Montana Department 
of Fish, Wildlife and Game, and the Nez Perce whose 1855 treaty terri-
tory includes a significant portion the Bitterroot Ecosystem.26 Public 
participation in identifying issues with grizzly bear recovery and seeking 
alternatives was ensured when the FWS published a Notice of Intent to 
recover the grizzly bear in the Bitterroot Ecosystem.27 The coalition of 
agencies and governmental entities began drafting an EIS and despite 
national elections and threats of reduced funding, the participants reaf-
firmed their commitment to the collaborative process. 
Also involved was a broad coalition of concerned stakeholders, in-
cluding national environmental organizations and industry representa-
tives who began crafting an alternative for the EIS - usually a task rele-
23 [d. See FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 10 (describing the proposed recovery area as des-
ignated by State highways). 
24 [d at Final Rule 3-4; National Wildlife Federation, Reintroducing Grizzly Bears to the Bit-
terroot Ecosystem, available at www.backstage.nwf.org/grizzlylbitterro.html(last visited Dec. 29, 
2002). An EIS is a required document under the wholly procedural environmental statute entitled 
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") for any "major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1998); 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502 
(discussing the purpose of and implementation procedures for an EIS). The purpose of an EIS is to 
apprise decision makers of the disruptive effects that may flow from their decisions. See Sierra Club 
v. Peterson, 717F.2d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
2S National Wildlife Federation, Reintroducing Grizzly Bears to the Billerroot Ecosystem, 
available at www.backstage.nwf.org/grizzlylbitterro.html(last visited Dec. 29,2002). 
26 ROD and Final Rule, supra note 5 at Final Rule 4; Treaty with the Nez Perce 12 Stats. 957 
(June 11, 1855). 
27 Notice: Reintroduction of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Ecosystem of East-Central Idaho 
and Western Montana, 60 Fed. Reg. 2399 (Jan. 9,1995). 
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gated to low-level bureaucrats within Federal agencies.28 Bill Mulligan, 
representing the Resource Organization on Timber Supply, an unlikely 
advocate for species reintroduction stated 
We're sticking with this process because it's the right thing to do. Yes, 
we could block grizzly restoration now, but at some point in the future 
the pendulum will swing the other way. If we can fmd a solution today 
that meets the needs of local people and the bear, we're all better off. 
This approach takes the politics and polarization out of the issue?9 
The fact that this was not business as usual was also recognized by 
Phil Church, President of Paperworkers Local 712 in Lewiston, Idaho, 
who stated, "We bridged the gaps and created a situation where industry, 
organized labor and environmentalists could work on an issue for the 
benefit of everybody.,,30 
A lengthy process of public meetings and scoping sessions ensued 
at locations throughout Idaho, Montana and Utah, and more than 3,300 
written comments were received from individuals, organizations and 
governmental agencies over the span of two years.3! In 1996, the coali-
tion submitted a proposal to the FWS that called for continued citizen 
management as the foundation of the recovery plan.32 The process re-
sulted in a Draft EIS and a proposed rule being issued to the public for 
further review and comment on the first week of July 1997 that included 
the coalition's proposal.33 By early July 1997, the FWS released a Draft 
EIS and proposed rule for public review and comment that included the 
coalition's proposal. 
The proposed rule, entitled "Proposed Establishment of a Nonessen-
tial Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area of 
Idaho and Montana,,,34 established the intent of the FWS to move for-
28 NEPA requires an EIS contain a range of "alternatives to the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. 1502.14 (2002). 
29 Hank Fischer, Bears and the Bitterroot 1996/97, available at www.defenders. 
orglhfisch02.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). 
30 [d. 
31 ROD and Final Rule, supra note 5 at Final Rule 5. Approximately eighty percent of writ-
ten responses were from residents of counties in Idaho and Montana that were directly affected by 
the proposal. See also FEIS Summary, supra note 2 at 6-8 (providing detailed discussion of issues 
and impacts raised). 
32 Supra note 21. 
33 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofIdaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg. 
35762 (July 2, 1997). 
34 A "nonessential" population means an experimental population whose loss would not 
likely reduce the survival of the entire species. FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 10. The nonessen-
tial status also allowed the Service to bring in bears from other populations, so long as the removal 
would not jeopardize the survival of the other population. ROD and Final Rule, supra note 5 at 
Final Rule 2. The proposed rule only addressed bears within the recovery area. Any reintroduced 
bears who may wander outside of the recovery area would be addressed by a special final rule meant 
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ward with grizzly bear recovery by means of the experimental population 
provision of Section IOU) of the ESA. 35 This infrequently used provision 
provided the Secretary of the Interior with extensive powers to reintro-
duce species under circumstances that, in the judgment of the Secretary, 
are in the best interests of the species.36 More important than the flexible 
nature of the decision to reintroduce the species was how the Secretary 
crafted the future management of the grizzly bear population. With the 
authority vested in him by the ESA to develop special programs to ad-
dress the particular needs of reintroduced populations, Secretary Bruce 
Babbitt chose to reintroduce twenty-five grizzly bears over a period of 
five years with a goal of 280 bears within fifty to one hundred-ten years, 
with the assistance of a fifteen member Citizen Management Committee 
("CMC") appointed by the Governors of Idaho and Montana, affected 
Indian tribes, and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior.37 These 
appointments to the CMC would reflect a broad segment of concern, 
bringing local citizens, environmentalists, industry representatives, tribal 
members and scientists38 to the table free from political motivations to 
execute a plan to save the species. Thanks to the collaborative approach 
used to craft the reintroduction plan and the forward-looking locally 
based approach used to implement it, reintroduction with a CMC was the 
Preferred Alternative and Proposed Action selected by the FWS.39 
to "accommodate" the needs of the communities and the bears. FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 12. 
Moreover, an experimental population may be reintroduced regardless of whether the experimental 
population is "essential to the continued existence" of the species. 16 U.S.C. § I 539(j)(2)(8) (2002). 
This provision directly responds to arguments made against the grizzly reintroduction that the spe-
cies does not need further reintroductions. Quite frankly, under Section 10(j), it does not matter. 
35 16 U.S.C. § I 539(j) (2002). 
36 Congress amended the ESA in 1982 to include Section 10(j) which provides for experi-
mental populations which means any population authorized for release which is located in a com-
pletely separate geographical area from any non-experimental population, that is, it must be outside 
the current range of the non-experimental population. 16 U.S.C. § I 539(j)(I)-(2). The ESA allows 
the Secretary to authorize the release of an experimental popUlation of a threatened species, so long 
as the release is based on the "best information available". Id. § 1539(j)(2)(8). As a threatened 
species, there is no requirement that the federal agencies consult under Section 7 of the ESA, and no 
requirement of critical habitat designation under Section 4. See id. § 1536(a)(2). This makes an 
experimental population an extremely flexible and "a more efficient conservation tool" than other 
measures. H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.s.C.C.A.N. 
2808. After all, the Secretary is vested with the authority "to issue such regulations as he deems 
necessary and advisable for the conservation" of listed species, including "all methods and proce-
dures" necessary to conserve both threatened and endangered species and nonessential experimental 
populations. Id. § 1533(d). 
37 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly 8ears in the 8itterroot Area ofldaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg. 
35770 (2002). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1539 (2002); H.R. Rep. No. 567, at 8. 
38 The scientists were non-voting members of the CMC. FEIS Summary, supra note 2 at 13. 
However, a Scientific Review Panel was also created to make recommendations to the CMC and 
determine compliance with the rule. FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 15. 
39 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly 8ears in the 8itterroot Area ofIdaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg. 
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C. THE CITIZEN MANAGEMENT COMMlTIEE 
Under the proposed rule, once appointed, the CMC would have the 
authority to develop management plans, oversee the activities of the state 
agencies working on the reintroduction program, and exercise other 
powers and authority on behalf of the Interior Secretary to manage the 
day-to-day grizzly reintroduction effort.40 CMC members would serve 
six-year terms and would meet biannually.41 The proposed rule did place 
parameters on the decision-making authority of the CMC, expressly lim-
iting the scope of the decisions made by mandating that all actions lead 
towards the recovery of the grizzly, be in accordance with the ESA and 
be based on the best scientific and commercial data available, and seek to 
minimize any social or economic impacts on local communities from the 
reintroduction plan.42 The CMC would also be asked to create a two-
year work plan outlining the Committee's policy for achieving reintro-
35763. In all, there were six alternatives as follows: (I) the Proposed Action and Preferred Alterna-
tive restoring the bear as a nonessential experimental population with citizen management; (IA) 
restoration of the grizzly bear as a nonessential experimental population with U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Management; (2) No action; (3) No Grizzly bear; (4) Restoration of grizzly bears as a threat-
ened population with full ESA protection and habitat restoration; and (4A) Restoration of grizzly 
bears as a threatened population with full ESA protection and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Man-
agement. See FEIS Summary, supra note 2 at 9 (for list and explanation). Pursuant to NEPA, the 
Federal agency responsible for the project is required to publish an EIS or an Environmental As-
sessment for any major Federal action that will have a significant effect on the environment. See 42 
U.S.C. 4332 (2002). When a full EIS is required based on the parameters of the project at issue, the 
agency must provide a range of alternatives for the proposal. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.2, 1502.14 
(2002) (discussing alternatives). These alternatives must include a "no action" alternative. [d. § 
l502.14(d). From the range of alternatives, the agency chooses a "preferred alternative" which will 
be used to follow through on the project because it has been designated as the most prudent choice 
for the project. The "proposed action" is the means by which the "preferred alternative" will be 
implemented. [d. § 1502.14. 
40 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofldaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg. 
35770. This note assumes that the Secretary is granted the necessary authority by the ESA to dele-
gate his authority to a CMC to oversee a species reintroduction program under the "such regulations 
as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species" language in 
Section 4(d) of the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. 1533(d) (2002). Subdelegation is often used by the Interior 
Department and other federal agencies to implement Federal programs. For a detailed discussion 
that concludes that such a delegation is lawful please see, Bredna L. Hall, Subdelegation of Authority 
Under the Endangered Species Act: Secretarial Authority to Subdelegate his Duties to a Citizen 
Management Committee as Proposed for the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Grizzly Bear Reintroduc-
tion, 20 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 81 (1999). Because the Secretary was vested with the 
authority under the ESA to use local officials and citizen controls to implement programs of this 
kind, the potential illegality of the subdelegation likely had no bearing on Secretary Norton's deci-
sion to abandon the reintroduction plan. In fact, neither the Secretary nor the Interior Department 
has mentioned this issue as a catalyst for proposing to withdraw the reintroduction plan. 
41 FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 13-14. 
42 !d. at 14; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of 
Nonessential Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofldaho and Montana, 
62 Fed. Reg. 35770. 
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duction. 43 Such a plan includes the ability of the CMC to recommend 
changes to land use practices and wildlife management strategies, subject 
to approval by the appropriate agency, should such changes be necessary 
to successfully effectuate the recovery plan.44 The Interior Secretary 
retained oversight authority over the CMC by reviewing the two-year 
policy plan and retaining the authority to disband the CMC and resume 
management authority if the Secretary determined that the CMC's deci-
sions were not leading to the recovery of the grizzly.45 Absent such in-
tervention, the diverse fifteen-member team had broad authority to exe-
cute the grizzly bear recovery plan in their own image - sensitive to 
both the concerns of environmentalists and local industry executives and 
residents. This collaborative process between the Interior Secretary and 
the CMC was also reflected though the provisions to terminate the pro-
gram. Ten years after reintroduction, the CMC would decide whether 
the reintroduction was successful. 46 After consultation with the CMC, 
should the Secretary agree that the reintroduction has failed to "produce 
a self-sustaining population" no more bears would be reintroduced; how-
ever, any remaining bears would retain their experimental statuS.47 
The flexibility in the CMC carried over into flexibility in protec-
tions for the bears. By avoiding selecting an alternative with full ESA 
. protection and habitat restoration, the FWS was able to avoid costly criti-
cal habitat restoration activities and could instead endorse a plan to rein-
troduce the bears that provided them with the opportunity to restore 
themselves within the existing habitat conditions. The designation also 
allows ground-disturbing resource extraction activities to continue within 
the recovery area.48 However, all the "take" prohibitions of Section 9 of 
the ESA did apply to the population.49 Thus, under the Preferred Alterna-
tive, citizens were allowed to continue to kill grizzly bears in self-
defense or in defense of others, and after receiving a permit from the 
FWS, could harass or deter bears from aggravating livestock and shoot to 
kill bears that wander onto private lands. 50 The outright hunting of griz-
zly bears, or harassment without a permit, was prohibited. 51 
43 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofIdaho and Montana, 62 Fed. Reg. 
35772. 
44 FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 12. 
45 Supra note 36. 
46 FEIS Summary, supra note 3 at 17 
47 [d. 
48 [d. at 16. 
49 [d. 
so [d. at 12. 
51 [d. 
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The Interior Secretary and the FWS crafted their proposed rule to 
provide the most flexible reintroduction strategy ever created under the 
ESA. Designating the population as nonessential experimental, the FWS 
could tailor the needs of the population to "specific areas and local con-
ditions, including meeting concerns of those opposed to reintroduction" 
by reducing "excessive governmental regulation on private lands, uncon-
trolled livestock depredation, excessive big game predation" and meeting 
the concerns of those who see species reintroduction as cutting out the 
"State government and local citizen involvement" from the process. 52 
Such a unique reintroduction strategy looked to forge new ground in the 
politics of species reintroduction, decentralizing control over the species 
from offices in Washington, D.C. and empowering local citizens living 
with the bears in their backyard. Moreover, the idea had strong political 
legs, as the Preferred Alternative was adopted in the November 2000 
Final Rule and received broad support from some unlikely bed-fellows, 
with one noticeable dissent - the political powers that be of the state of 
Idaho. 
III. REACTION To THE GRIZZLY REINTRODUCTION PLAN 
Returning the grizzly to the Bitterroot Ecosystem polarized western 
politics and exemplified 
the classic dilemma faced by conservation biologists - a species in 
danger, scientific uncertainty regarding its biological needs, and a com-
plex backdrop of real or perceived social and economic concerns. Our 
challenge is to meet the pressing environmental goal of expanding the 
grizzly's range and numbers while maintaining the support of people 
who live near the bears.53 
But, widespread public support was surprisingly not hard to find. 
Due to the remote wilderness chosen for the reintroduction area, the rein-
troduction plan did not actually affect large populations of citizens. 54 
Only a handful of bears were being reintroduced during the first phase of 
the recovery. 55 A century later, biologists expected only 280 bears ex-
pected to roam the vast, roadless and unpopulated 5,785 square mile area 
reintroduction. 56 Despite these favorable conditions for limited opposi-
tion to the reintroduction, the grizzly bears quickly became the target of 
scare tactics and political positioning. 
S2 Id. at 10. 
S3 Supra note 23 (quoting Mike Roy a biologist for the National Wildlife Federation). 
S4 See supra note 14. 
ss See supra note 30. 
S6/d. 
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A. PUBLIC REACTION TO THE REINTRODUCTION PLAN 
In the year after the publication of the Proposed Action, the FWS 
held seven public meetings in which 1,400 people attended and 293 indi-
viduals testified. 57 In addition, over 24,000 individuals, organizations, 
and governmental entities submitted written comments, a majority of 
which supported reintroduction under the Preferred Alternative, indicat-
ing the strong feelings people had about the benefits of the potential griz-
zly bear reintroduction. 58 A survey taken soon after the release of the 
proposed rule found that sixty percent of Idaho and Montana residents 
who originally opposed the reintroduction in whole, favored the reintro-
duction plan as written with the citizen management alternative. 59 In all, 
seventy-six percent of public comment received by the FWS prior to 
publishing the Final Rule in November 2000 supported the reintroduc-
tion plan.60 
The local and national media also documented these strong feelings. 
For example, the Washington Post published a feature on the "nontradi-
tional coalition" and ABC Nightly News made the CMC a topic of a 
special Earth Day report.61 Nearly every daily Idaho and Montana news-
paper published an editorial praising the collaborative process used to 
create the Draft EIS.62 The conservative Idaho Post Falls Register called 
the proposal "exciting" and opined that the plan "could set a trend for the 
next couple of decades in working out environmental problems.,,63 The 
Bozeman Chronicle called the proposal "one of the most forward-
thinking developments on the threatened species front.,,64 The Spokes-
man-Review in Spokane, Washington called it "a model for 1990s envi-
ronmentalism. ,,65 
B. POLITICAL REACTION TO THE REINTRODUCTION PLAN 
The Preferred Alternative and the process by which it was created 
also received broad bi-partisan political support. Senator Michael Crapo 
(R-ldaho) had originally complained about the reintroduction idea, stat-
ing: "No one in Idaho wants these bears back. This is a plan ... that is 
57 ROD and Final Rule, supra note 5 at Final Rule 6. 
58Id. 
59 National Wildlife Federation, supra note 11. 
60 U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Summary of Public Comments at Intro 7, 9 (March 2000). 
61 Supra note 23. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64 Id. 
65Id. 
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being shoved down our throats.',&; The Senator added that the only ac-
ceptable plan would be one completely run by local authorities.67 True to 
his word, the then Representative, having seen the Washington Post 
story, sent a copy of the article to all the members of the House Republi-
can Task Force on the Environment and added, "One of the key chal-
lenges we face as Republicans is to develop a proper framework within 
which we can address environmental issues; [i]t takes creativity consen-
sus-building and a willingness to work together.,,68 Recognizing the 
CMC and the proposed rule as an example of this workable approach, the 
Idaho Congressman praised the collaborative approach, but stropped 
short of endorsing the grizzly reintroduction plan. 
Montana's Republican Governor Marc Racicot who publicly en-
dorsed the froposal, calling it "superb", supported reintroduction under 
the CMC.6 He added, "Without the detailed and intensive involvement 
of Montana and Idaho citizens their proposal envisions, the chances for 
success in that reintroduction would be greatly diminished.,,7o On the 
other side of Montana's political spectrum, Senator Max Baucus, the 
ranking Democrat on the Senate committee that oversees the ESA, also 
endorsed the proposal, stating that "The [ESA's] future hinges to a great 
degree upon the extent to which it is demonstrated to be efficient, flexi-
ble and responsive to local concerns.,,71 
C. DISSENTING VOICES 
Just when it seemed that regulators, environmentalists and industry 
leaders had succeeded in creating a universally acceptable species rein-
troduction plan, other political voices began to be heard which were far 
less than supportive. Despite the support the plan had garnered from 
their constituents, Representative Helen Chenoweth (R-ID), Senators 
Larry Craig (R-ID) and Dirk Kempthorne (R-Idaho), Idaho Governor 
Phil Batt (R), and Idaho state and local government officials expressed 
both opposition to the reintroduction plan and concerns as to whether the 
Secretary had the authority to create a CMC in the first place.72 
On June 12, 1997, during an oversight hearing held before the 
House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health chaired by Represen-
66 H. Josef Hebert, supra note I. 
67 Id. 
68 Supra note 23. 
69 !d. 
7° Id. 
71Id. 
72 Fredreka Schouten, Idaho Officials Tell Congress: No Grizzlies!, Idaho Statesman, June 
13, 19?7, at AI. 
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tative Chenoweth on the reintroduction plan, these concerns became well 
known. Wielding a Joint Memorial passed by the Idaho state legislature 
earlier that year opposing the reintroduction of the grizzly bear in Idaho, 
Representative Chenoweth stated: "With the Governor saying no, the 
State legislature saying no, the entire Idaho congressional delegation 
saying no, and the people ofldaho sayin~ no, what part of no doesn't the 
Department of the Interior understand?" 7 She continued, "I question the 
wisdom of an effort to place a lethal weapon into the public domain for-
ests; [i]t is my belief that the issue of reintroduction of the grizzly bear is 
an issue of local control as well as one of state's rights.,,74 Later she 
added that the plan was akin to "introducing sharks at the beach.,,75 
Senator Kempthorne submitted his concerns by way of a prepared 
statement submitted to the Subcommittee, in which he stated, "[a]s an 
Idahoan, I worry about what these dangerous predators will do to the 
people ofIdaho ... because of the very great danger that Idahoans would 
face if we allow the introduction of grizzly bears into the State, I cannot 
support any plan unless it is supported by the people of the State ... Ida-
hoans should have the right to make that decision.,,76 Idaho Fish and 
Game Commissioner John Bums was slightly less diplomatic when he 
objected to the plan at a public hearing in Salmon, Idaho, stating: 
"[d]on't just say 'No!' to grizzlies. Tell them, 'Hell no!'. When 1'0u 
make a deal with the devil, the devil is going to win in the long run.,,7 
Not to be out done, things were not all copasetic from the environ-
mentalists' perspective either. The head of Friends of the Wild Swan in 
Montana, Steve Kelly, declared that the plan was the "biggest sham 
that's even been perpetuated in the northern Rockies; [t]he timber indus-
try only wants to do what they've always wanted top do, which is cut 
down trees.,,78 As far as the environmental groups that were involved in 
the plan, Mr. Kelly said of them, "[w]hen you crawl into bed with the 
enemy, you become the enemy.,,79 
7J Statement of Rep. Helen Chenoweth, Testimony at Oversight Hearing on the Reintroduc-
tion of the Grizzly Bear in the Public Domain, before the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Forests and Forest Health, June 12, 1997 at 9. 
14 Id. at 11-12. 
1S Supra note 23. 
16 Statement of Rep. Helen Chenoweth, supra note 73 at 17-18 (reading into the record the 
statement of Senator Kempthorne). 
11 Supra note 23. 
18/d. (quoting a High County News interview). 
19Id. (referring to Defenders of Wildlife and National Wildlife Federation). 
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D. PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL REALITIES 
Although these comments made for good press, both sides over-
looked the very fact that their concerns with the reintroduction and the 
way the CMC were formed were actually addressed within the plan they 
so vigorously attacked. Rather than champion a plan supported by a 
majority of the people of Idaho, Idaho's political leaders cavalierly dis-
missed the wishes of the electorate and set out on a media and legal cam-
paign to quash the reintroduction.8o 
Both Senator Kempthorne and Representative Chenoweth expressed 
concern that the federal government was imposing its will on the people 
of Idaho by introducing a lethal species.81 However, nothing could be 
further from the truth on both accounts. The state's rights and the rights 
of Idahoans, however, were being protected to a previously unheard of 
degree in the context of species reintroduction. 82 While the pioneering 
conservationist Aldo Leopold first conceived of the idea of cooperative 
management of species between citizens and the government in 1936,83 
the idea had never been put into practice until the grizzly bear plan was 
developed. 84 This realization was lost on Idaho's political leadership. 
Also overlooked was the fact that a majority of Idaho citizens and lead-
ing Idaho industry groups were involved in crafting the CMC concept 
and were going to have a major role in shaping the day-to-day manage-
ment of the reintroduced species.85 
These facts belie the state's opposition, indicating their objection 
may have been more ideological than it was in direct response to the real 
or perceived concerns of the state's citizens. This combined "anti-
environmental", "anti-regulatory", and "anti-federal" ideology com-
monly associated with the state obfuscated the real details of the Elan and 
the real benefits it provided over other reintroduction strategies. 6 Thus, 
rather than incurring the ire of those who supported the reintroduction 
plan, the anti-species message played well with the conservative popu-
lous and powerful in-state ranching interests that had been fighting other 
federal species reintroduction plans for years.87 By portraying any spe-
cies reintroduction within Idaho as a threat to life and livelihood, the 
environmentalists and timber representatives who crafted the reintroduc-
80 See supra note 72. 
81 See supra notes 73 and 76. 
82 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing innovative nature of the CMC). 
83 Supra note 23 (discussing Aldo Leopold's 1936 essay "Threatened Species"). 
84 See supra note 29. 
85 See supra Section II.B. 
86 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra Section V.B. (discussing wolf reintroduction). 
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tion plan were effectively placed on the fringe and categorized as "out-
of-touch" with the real needs of the state, thereby marginalizing what 
would otherwise have been a formidable combined political voice. 
As with any cutting-edge policy initiative, especially a high-profile 
plan that attempted to find middle ground in the high stakes road of envi-
ronmental politics, there were bound to be dissenters. Even though the 
grizzly bear is a reclusive species, unlikely to stray from the recovery 
area, some residents were understandably fearful of the bears.88 Others 
distrusted the union between industry and environmentalists.89 Still, the 
facts surrounding the potential benefits of the reintroduction and the time 
in which it took to craft the plan underscore the unprecedented nature of 
the project. In just four years, a coalition of diverse interests had formed 
to write a Draft EIS that had received overwhelmingly positive public 
support90 for the cost of a Federal appropriation of $250,000.91 It had 
taken over fifteen years of contentious debate and eight years of planning 
at the cost of six million for the Federal government to craft, and subse-
quently impose, a reintroduction plan for the gray wolf in Yellowstone. 92 
And, in that case, the agriculture industry was never consulted, leading to 
on-the-ground tensions that remain heated today, whether they occur 
leaning across a fence post or are played out in the courts. In stark con-
trast, the timber indus~ was involved from the beginning of the grizzly 
reintroduction process. 3 As a direct result, usual foes became partners 
and a cost-effective, mutually agreeable reintroduction plan was created 
to recovery the grizzly. 
Unfortunately for the grizzly bear and the groups that had fought to-
gether to create a workable compromise reintroduction strategy that 
seemly balanced the needs of the species and people who depend on the 
land for their livelihoods, the best available politics against reintroduc-
tion eventually superceded the best available science that supported a 
return of the grizzlies as the only means to ensure the eventual recovery 
of the species. By the time the Final Rule adopting the Preferred Alter-
native of a nonessential experimental population with citizen manage-
ment was published in the Federal Register on November 17, 2000,94 
Senator Kempthorne was Governor Kempthorne, a new regime was 
88 National Wildlife Federation, supra note II. 
89 !d. 
90 See supra Section II.B. 
91 Supra note 23. 
92/d. 
93 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
94 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofidaho and Montana, 65 Fed. Reg. 
26924 (2002). The Rule became effective on December 18, 2000. Id. at 26924. 
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about to come to power in the Nation's capitol, and accordingly, the state 
ofldaho's delegation wasted no time enlisting the Bush Administration's 
help to scuttle the reintroduction plan. 
IV. A LEGAL BATILE AGAINST REINTRODUCTION ENSUES 
A month after the publication of the Final Rule authorizing the rein-
troduction of twenty-five grizzlies to Idaho and Montana, Idaho Gover-
nor Dirk Kempthorne and members of the self-proclaimed "Idaho Con-
stitutional Defense Council" which was comprised of the Governor, At-
torney General, Idaho Senate President Pro Tern and Idaho Speaker of 
the House, held a press conference indicating their intent to "pursue both 
legislative and legal action" to stop the grizzly reintroduction plan.95 
Using money appropriated by the state legislature for such purposes, the 
Governor announced that the state was going "to go to federal court" to 
stop the "poorly though-out federal decision" to reintroduce the grizzly 
bears.96 He added, "Many of us had made it clear that we oppose the 
introduction of the flesh-eating, anti-social animal into Idaho. This is 
probably the first federal policy that knowingly can, and will, lead to the 
injury and death of citizens.',97 
A. STATE OF IDAHO v. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
On January 19, 2001, the state followed through on its threat and 
brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against 
then-Secretary Bruce Babbitt to enjoin the DOl from implementing the 
grizzly bear reintroduction program in ldaho.98 The complaint also 
sought a declaration that the reintroduction plan violated the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution99 by unlawfully comman-
deering state officials to carry out a Federal policy and the plan violated 
93 Press Release from Governor Dirk Kempthome's Office, State to Seek Legal Council to 
Fight Federal Grizzly Bear Plan, Dec. 12, 2002, available at www2.state.id. uslgov/pr/2000 
lDeclPRl212.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). 
96 [d. 
97 [d. It bears mentioning that grizzlies are not "flesh-eating", and are primarily vegetarians. 
Grizzly Bear Recovery, supra note 5. In fact, the potential loss of ungulates (such as elk) was esti-
mated by the Service to be equivalent to the loss of elk due to current cougar predation. [d. Live-
stock losses would range, based on 280 bears, from 4-8 cattle and 544 sheep per year. !d. More-
over, bear-caused human mortality is extremely rare, with only 17 injuries (including 3 mortalities) 
in 156 years in the Yellowstone Ecosystem outside of the national park. [d. 
98 State ofIdaho v. United States. Dep't of the Interior et aI., CA-OI-OI06 (D. D.C. Jan. 19, 
2001) (hereinafter Complaint). 
99 The Tenth Amendment states that "[t)he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." U.S. CONST., amend. 
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National Environmental Policy Act by arbitrarily and capriciously failing 
to consider risks to human health and safety, and the economic and po-
tential land use restrictions resulting from the proposed grizzly bear rein-
troduction. loo 
The state's arguments were quite simple. The rhetoric-filled com-
plaint asserted that the Final Rule "unconstitutionally impose[d] obliga-
tion's on the state's executive branch of government, usurpe[d] the State 
of Idaho's sovereign and traditional right to regulate land use and fish 
and wildlife within its boarders, interfere[d] with the State of Idaho's 
duty to protect its citizens from physical harm, and compromises the 
[ESA] protections currently afforded existing bears."lol Detailing the 
state's opposition to the reintroduction plan since the Draft EIS was is-
sued in June 1997, the more interesting and legally defensible of the 
state's two claims for relief alleged that formation of the CMC violated 
the Tenth Amendment by forcing the Governor of Idaho to nominate 
citizens to serve on the Committee and directing the Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game to exercise day-to-day authority to impose, permit and 
enforce the decisions of the CMC. 102 
Couched as a classic state's rights claim, the state was seeking to 
overturn the Final Rule because the Secretary was impermissibly seeking 
to force the state to administer and enforce a Federal program. 103 Yet, 
the claim that allowing state officials to implement a federal program 
impermissibly violates the state's sovereignty actually turns the notion of 
state's rights on its head. By arguing that federal delegation of ESA au-
thority to states (or to a CMC) violates the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, Idaho suggested, oddly, that had the Interior Department 
retained federal implementation of the program it would not have vio-
lated the state's sovereignty and would have been legally permissible. 104 
100 Complaint ~~ 43-53,57. 
101 [d. ~ I. 
102 [d. ~~ 33, 37. This article does not discuss the NEPA based claim as the author does not 
believe that the argument was made in good faith. Each of the documents supporting the decision to 
reintroduce the grizzly allowed for substantial public comment and provided a full range of alterna-
tives to the reintroduction. Idaho's objections based n failing to fully analyze health and economic 
impacts would not have passed a facial test based on the FEIS and ROD relied upon by the Service 
in adopting the Final Rule. All that is required under NEPA is that the ErS "set forth sufficient 
information for the general public to make an informed evaluation and for the decision maker to 
'consider fully the environmental factors involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing 
the risks of harm' ... the court may not rule an ErS inadequate if the agency has made an adequate 
compilation of relevant information, has analyzed it reasonably, has not ignored pertinent data, and 
has made disclosures to the public." Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 70 I 
F.2d 1011, 1029 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
103 These suits have traditionally arisen regarding Federal control laws that impose duties on 
state law enforcement to carry out the enforcement provisions. 
104 [d. This argument highlights the paradox of species reintroduction. On the one hand, 
states generally resist federal reintroduction programs because they lack local control. Yet, when a 
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Thus, Idaho was actually fighting against the very state's rights they 
were purporting to defend - that state citizens and regulators should be 
able to decide how federal programs are to be implemented within the 
state's borders. Ironically, had the CMC alternative never existed, there 
would have been no federal directive to the state to act and Idaho would 
have lacked much of the legal basis they used to challenge the reintro-
duction and grizzly bears may now be on their way to the Bitterroot Eco-
system. 105 Nevertheless, this little known case was never briefed or ar-
gued past the complaint stage. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS' ATTEMPTED INTERVENTION 
On March 13, 2001 Washington, D.C.-based environmental organi-
zations Defenders of Wildlife and the National Wildlife Federation at-
tempted to intervene in the suit on behalf of the Federal defendants. 106 
Before the court could rule on the intervention motion, however, attor-
neys for the Justice Department and the state of Idaho entered into a Joint 
Stipulation on March 21,2001 staying the case until settlement negotia-
tions could occur. 107 The basis for the environmental groups interven-
tion was clear. The two groups were part of the coalition who took part 
in the creation of the Draft EIS that formulated the CMC and therefore 
represented interests different from those of the Justice Department or 
the Interior Department. 108 Moreover, when the sole issue in the case 
was the legality of the reintroduction decision, the only potential settle-
ment would result in an abdication of the proposed reintroduction. 109 In 
addition, facing a new Republican Administration, the groups were con-
cerned that the Interior Department would not adequately represent their 
interests. llo These concerns were not unfounded. 
The Clinton-era reintroduction plan was adopted into a Final Rule 
two weeks after the November 2000 presidential election by a lame duck 
President and Interior Secretary that were generally supportive of endan-
gered species issues. I I I By the time of the lawsuit, however, Mr. Bush 
federal reintroduction plan is created which guarantees local control by delegating authority to state 
Governors to appoint state representatives to the Citizen Management Committee, Idaho still resists 
the proposal because it interferes with the state's right to, presumably, choose to take no action 
whatsoever. 
lOS See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
106 Motion and Memorandum in Support of Intervention filed by Defenders of Wildlife and 
National Wildlife Federation (filed Mar. 13,2001). 
107/d. 
108 Id. 
109 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
l1OId. at 14. 
111 See Final Rule supra note 9. 
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had been adjudicated to be the winner of the presidential election, a new 
Republican Secretary of the Interior was set to be nominated, and new 
Department of Justice attorneys were set to defend the actions of the 
prior Democratic Administration. While no endangered species-related 
polices had emerged from the fledging regime, the environmental groups 
were fearful that a policy change, likely predisposed against the reintro-
duction plan, was underway. In part, these fears were based on a state-
ment made by then Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton in 1996 as-
serting her thoughts that the Tenth Amendment had "not been given the 
power one would think that it should be entitled to" and that "the courts 
have not been strong defenders of the amendment.,,112 On May 1,2001, 
the environmental groups sought to clarify their motion to become par-
ties to the mediation in order to review and comment on any substantive 
result of the settlement discussions. I 13 
The court, however, never heard their intervention motion. On June 
22,2001, the Interior Department conceded the case in its entirety, decid-
ing to abandon its decision to reintroduce the grizzly bear into the Bitter-
root Ecosystem publishing a notice of intent to select the "no action" 
alternative. 114 The shrewd politically motivated litigation of the state of 
Idaho, filed after the Bush Administration came into office, had resulted 
in closed-doors negotiations that derailed the CMC and resulted in an 
unprecedented de-facto gubernatorial veto of a Federal decision to rein-
troduce a threatened species. And, for the first time in the history of the 
FWS and the ESA, a proposal was made to withdraw an existing Record 
of Decision. I 15 The only question remained: would the Administration 
get away with it? 
v. SECRETARY NORTON'S DECISION To SHELVE THE GRIZZLY BEAR 
REINTRODUCTION PLAN 
In early June 2001, Secretary Norton proclaimed that she was "fully 
committed to the recovery of the grizzly bear in the lower 48 states.,,116 
1I2Id. (quoting speech by Gale Norton in Vail Colorado, Aug. 24, 1996, the entire text of 
which may be viewed at www.i2i.orgiSUPTDOCS/stevensonivaiI96.htm#norton) (last visited Dec. 
29,2002). 
113 Motion to Clarify or Amend Order filed by Defenders of Wildlife and National Wildlife 
Federation (filed May 1,2001). 
114 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Establishment of Nonessential 
Experimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area ofldaho and Montana, 66 Fed. Reg. 
33620-22 (July 2, 1997). 
liS National Wildlife Federation, Scientists Call on Interior Secretary Norton to Reinstate 
Grizzly Bear Recovery Program, Aug. 16, 2001, available at www.nw[org! griz-
zly/scientistsreinstatement.html (last visited Oct. 15.]\, 2002). 
116 Silliman, supra note 4. 
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Just weeks later, however, the Secretary reneged on this commitment. In 
her fIrst major wildlife decision since taking office, Secretary Norton 
confIrmed most environmentalists' and many Democrats' worst fear 
when she dealt a major blow to grizzly bear recovery efforts by cowing 
to political pressure and abandoning the decision of her predecessor in 
favor of an official position of "no action.,,117 This decision not only 
acquiesced to the demands of the state of Idaho, but expressly contra-
dicted her promise to fully implement the ESA made during her Senate 
confIrmation hearing, which charges her to take all appropriate and sci-
entifically-based measures necessary to recover imperiled species such as 
the grizzly. I 18 The action also contradicted statements made by the Sec-
retary since she took office earlier in the year attacking the previous Ad-
ministration for business-as-usual Washington politics and indicating her 
desire to pay more attention to local controls and the concerns of local 
citizens. 119 Most troubling was the fact that the plan she so vehemently 
attacked could not have been more locally-based and locally controlled, 
leading many in the environmental community to speculate that her deci-
sion on the bear "send a chilling message for other wildlife recovery ef-
forts across the country.,,120 Of additional concern were the specious 
contents of the Federal Register notice, which was entirely devoid of 
scientifIc explanation for the change in the government's decision.121 
The notice simply stated that the FWS "has determined that it is not pru-
dent" to recover grizzly bears in the Bitterroot Ecosystem. 122 This lack 
of scientifIc support did not go unnoticed, however. 
117 The selection of the "no action" alternative does not necessarily mean that the Service 
was precluding the reintroduction of the population of grizzly bears in the Bitterroot Ecosystem. 
Rather, if selected after the public comment period, the Service will simply remove the pertinent 
regulations adopted by the Final Rule implementing the CMC and the reintroduction plan. However, 
seeing how it took over five years to develop the CMC plan, the practical result of doing nothing is 
the death knell for reintroduction in the Bitterroot Ecosystem. 
118 See Defenders of Wildlife, Statement of Rodger Schlickeisen. President of Defenders of 
Wildlife, on Secretary of the Interior's Rejection of Selway-Bitterroot Grizzly Plan, June 21, 200 I, 
available at www.defenders.orglreleaseslpr200Ilpr0621 0 I .htrnl (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). 
119 Id. 
120 National Wildlife Federation, Interior Secretary Norton Shelves Grizzly Bear Recovery in 
Northern Rockies in Favor of "No Aciion" Decision Send "Chilling Message ", June 20, 200 I (quot-
ing Jaime Rappaport Clark, Senior Vice President for National Wildlife Federation), available at 
www.nwf.orglgrizzly/nortongrizzly.html. 
121 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Establishment of a Nonessential Ex-
perimental Population of Grizzly Bears in the Bitterroot Area of Idaho and Montana; Removal of 
Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 33620-22 (June 22, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
122 Id. 
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A. PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE No ACTION DECISION 
Immediately after the Secretary's decision, the title of an editorial in 
the Missoulian concisely summarized the concerns many in the West, 
and across the county, were feeling, "By Ignoring Science and Yielding 
to Politics, the Secretary of the Interior Endangers Collaborative Ap-
proaches to Species Protection.,,123 The editorial proceeded to blast Sec-
retary Norton's decision, accusing her of making decisions based on "ir-
rational fears and political expediency" and concluding that "[m]ost en-
dangered by this decision, however, is the spirit of cooperation and inno-
vation reflected by the reintroduction plan. . . . Although her boss has 
given great lip FWS to cooperative approaches to such matters, Norton is 
abandoning a wonderful opportunity to demonstrate the merits of envi-
ronmental pragmatism.,,12 Other news stories followed, including a 
press release from a group of scientists, including the American Society 
of Mammalogists, the International Association for Bear Research and 
Management, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
Bear Specialists Group, and Idaho and Montana Chapters of the Wildlife 
Society, who urged the Secretary to implement the Record of Decision 
and the Final Rule "as scientific studies overwhelmingly suggest this 
action is essential to recovery of this native carnivore in the lower 48 
states." 125 
At the close of the mandatory sixty-day comment period following 
the Secretary's decision to abandon the reintroduction, the FWS issued a 
summary of the public comment received on October 22, 2001. 126 The 
results were astounding. The Secretary's proposal drew 28,222 com-
ments from individuals, organizations, and agencies in fifty states and 
nineteen countries, over ninety-seven percent of which disaffeed with 
the Secretary's decision to abandon the reintroduction plan. 27 In the 
area most directly affected by the reintroduction plan, out of2,745 letters 
from Montana, ninety-three percent disagreed with the Secretary, and out 
of 3,055 letters received from Idaho, ninety-eight rercent disagreed with 
the decision to shelve the reintroduction plan. 12 Although the FWS 
made sure to mention that eighty-eight percent of the letters were pre-
typed form letters, even of those letters that were personally written as 
123 Editorial, The Missoulian, June 25, 200 I. 
1241d. 
12l National Wildlife Federation, supra note 90. 
126 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Summary of Public Comments, Re-Eval of ROD/ Re-
moval of Regulations for Reintroduction of Grizzly Bears in Bitterroot Area of Idaho and Montana, 
October 200 I. 
127 Id. at Intro- ) 4. 
1281d. at Intro-I3. 
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"original comments", Norton's decision was disagreed with by eighty-
f h d· 129 two percent 0 t ose respon mg. 
In response to the overwhelming public support urging the Secretary 
to reinstate the reintroduction plan, Interior Department spokesman Mark 
Pfeifle dismissed the numbers, saying that public opinion will not be the 
determining factor in the plan's future. "Public opinion will be a portion 
of the decision-making process. But, it won't be the only thing ... [The 
Plan] was never a public opinion contest.,,130 
B. CMC STAKEHOLDER RESPONSE - THE NEZ PERCE TRIBE 
One of the sovereign governments involved in the development of 
the citizen management alternative was the Nez Perce. \31 The reason for 
the Tribe's involvement was two-fold. First, the Tribe aboriginally oc-
cupied almost thirteen million acres encompassing most of modem day 
north central Idaho, western Montana, northeastern Oregon and south-
eastern Washington. 132 This territory was later ceded to the Federal gov-
ernment as part of the Tribe's Treaty of 1855, but in return the Tribe 
reserved certain treaty rights in the area designated as the grizzl?; recov-
ery area for hunting, fishing and gathering, and ceremonial uses. 33 Sec-
ond, by the time the CMC was being developed, the Tribe was already 
intimately familiar with endangered species reintroduction, as it had been 
in charge of the day-to-day recovery efforts of the gray wolf in Idaho 
since the state refused to be involved in the program in the early 
1990s.134 In fact, the only difference between the story of the reintroduc-
tion of the wolf and the bear was that the Tribe and other stakeholders 
had learned from their mistakes with the wolf reintroduction. Cognizant 
of the intense political disagreement and local conflicts that occurred 
when the plan to reintroduce the wolf was forced upon Western states by 
the Department of the Interior, 135 the Tribe and the other members of the 
129 Id. at Intro-14. 
130 Associated Press, 'Public Opinion' Agrees with Grizzly Rein/ro, October 25, 200 I. 
131 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
132 Indian Court of Claims, Docket No. 175 at 18 III (1967). 
133 See 12 Stats. 957, arts. I, III. 
134 The Tribe has received both awards and nationwide recognition for its leadership in gray 
wolf recovery in Idaho. In addition to recognition from leading environmental groups and newspa-
pers, the Tribe was a 1999 recipient of the prestigious "High Honors in Tribal Governance" award 
from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government's Honoring Nations program. See Ford Founda-
tion: Nation's Top 10 Innovative Government Programs Named: Federal. State, Local and Tribal 
Programs Each Awarded $100.000, Oct. 14, 1999, available at www.fordfound.org/newslview_ 
news_detail.cfm?news_index=19 (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). 
I3S Idaho Wolf Recovery Program, Restoration and Management o/Gray Wolves in Central 
Idaho Progress Report 1999-2001 at 6-7 (Jan. 2002), available at www.nezperce.org/ Pro-
grams/wildlife_program.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). There is a great deal of Similarity between 
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coalition decided instead to seek a collaborative approach to grizzly rein-
troduction. 136 
From the outset, the Tribe was committed to grizzly reintroduction 
in the Bitterroot and welcomed its opportunity to have a role in the day-
to-day management authority over the grizzly within its aboriginal terri-
tory in Idaho. In a press release issued shortly after the Final Rule was 
published, Samuel N. Penney, Chairman of the Nez Perce Tribal Execu-
tive Committee stated 
[t]he Tribe is pursuing an active role in the recovery of the grizzly for 
both the ecological benefits of returning the bear to its rightful place 
and for the cultural benefits recovery would provide to the Nez Perce 
people .... We look forward to working with our neighbors, the 
[CMC] , and appropriate agencies to ensure the success of the grizzly 
. d . 137 
remtro uctlOn program. 
Not surprisingly, after being poised to appoint a representative to 
the CMC, the Tribe responded with harsh criticism of the Secretary's 
decision to set aside the Final Rule, asserting that the Secretary's actions 
the wolf reintroduction program and that of the grizzly. Gray wolves (Canis lupus) were distributed 
throughout North America prior to the arrival of European settlers. As civilization moved westward, 
wolves were systematically eliminated because they were seen as destructive predators of big game 
and livestock. Id. By the 1930s only Minnesota retained a viable wolf population. Id. Wolves gained 
endangered status in 1974 with their listing under the ESA. Id. In 1987 the U. S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service completed the revised Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan. Id. Four years later 
Congress instigated the Environmental Impact Statement process for wolf reintroductions into 
Yellowstone National Park and central Idaho. Id. Extensive public input showed overwhelming 
support for wolf recovery, and the Secretary of Interior approved the Final EIS, making 
reintroductions a reality. Id. In 1995 and 1996, 66 wolves were captured in Alberta and British 
Columbia, Canada; 35 were released in central Idaho, and 31 were reintroduced into Yellowstone 
National Park. Id. The ultimate goal of the northern Rocky Mountain wolf restoration effort is to 
establish self-sustaining populations on gray wolves and remove the gray wolf from the Endangered 
Species List. Id. The recovery goal for the Northern Rocky Mountain Restoration Region is to 
maintain 30 breeding pairs equitably distributed across the 3 restoration areas of northwest Montana, 
greater Yellowstone, and central Idaho for 3 years. Id. The Final EIS designated nonessential 
experimental popUlation areas for the greater Yellowstone and central Idaho restoration areas in 
which all wolves (released and naturally occurring) were classified as nonessential experimental 
animals. Id. The Service developed the Final Rule that governs how wolves are managed within the 
nonessential experimental population areas. Id. This Rule allowed for management flexibility to 
meet public concerns and minimize conflicts regarding the presence of wolves, including effects on 
wild ungulate populations and livestock. Id. The Service, the Tribe, and USDA Wildlife Services 
Wildlife Services comprise the Idaho Wolf Recovery Program Recovery Program sharing legal 
responsibility for recovering wolves in Idaho. Id. The Recovery Program has adopted a collaborative 
approach working closely with other government and private entities to balance the biological needs 
of wolves with the social concerns ofldahoans. Id. The state ofldaho has not been involved. Id. 
136 See supra Section ILB. 
137 Nez Perce Tribe, Tribe Responds to Record 0/ Decision Regarding Reintroducing Grizzly 
Bears into the Bitterroot Ecosystem, Nov. 16, 2000 (on file with Nez Perce Tribe Office of Legal 
Counsel in Lapwai, Idaho). 
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not only threatened the continued existence of the fgizzly but under-
mined the very foundation of the Tribe's sovereignty.! 8 
In a comment letter sent to Secretary Norton in August 2001, the 
Tribe noted the lack of rationale provided for the Secretary's decision 
and the failure of the Secretary to engage in government-to-government 
consultation with the Nez Perce Tribe prior to making the decision, de-
spite the Final Rule's guarantee that grizzly bear recovery will be under-
taken "in cooperation with ... the Nez Perce Tribe" and the notice of 
intent's statement that the government was going to continue to work 
closely with "States and local governments" in developing a grizzly rein-
troduction strategy. 139 The Tribe also highlighted the contradictions 
between the June 2001 Notice ofIntent to adopt the "no action" alterna-
tive and the November Record of Decision (ROD) supporting the Final 
Rule, and the numerous scientific and common sense reasons for the 
Secretary to stay with the CMC approach as follows: 
The No Action alternative will not allow for similar local control [of 
wildlife management decisions] and will sacrifice the efforts of numer-
ous concerned citizens ... from all walks of life - ranchers, loggers, 
environmentalists, and others - [who] worked in the spirit of coopera-
tion and collaboration to develop a plan that would protect the grizzly 
d I I . 140 an oca mterests. 
Based on these concerns, and the long-standing cultural and spiri-
tual connection between the Tribe and grizzly bear, the Tribal govern-
ment and the Tribe's Wildlife Department have been seeking out differ-
ent options to ensure the return of the grizzly to the Bitterroot Ecosys-
tem. While those sovereign decisions are made, the Tribe remains com-
mitted to broad citizen involvement in the plan and the accountability 
such diverse stakeholders bring to the reintroduction effort. As the 
Tribe's Chairman, Samuel N. Penney explained, "As with wolves, re-
turning grizzly bears to their native ecosystem will be a lesson in learn-
. 1· . h h . ,,141 mg to lve WIt t ese creatures once agam. 
138 See Nez Perce Tribe's Comments in Opposition to Proposal to Select No Action Alterna-
tive for Grizzly Bear Recovery, Aug. 20,2001 (on file with Nez Perce Tribe Office of Legal Counsel 
in Lapwai, Idaho). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Nez Perce Tribe, supra note \04 (quoting Chairman Samuel N. Penney). 
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VI. THE FUTURE FOR GRIZZLY REINTRODUCTION IN THE BITTERROOT 
ECOSYSTEM 
The citizen management concept took a plunge into uncharted wa-
ters. Previously, endangered species management in the United States 
was based largely on a federally driven, top-down system of regulations 
and enforcement mechanisms. In contrast, the grizzly bear reintroduction 
plan was unique, embracing the spirit and intent of the ESA, but relying 
on local communities and citizens working in collaboration with agen-
cies to develop and implement the most effective and least costly plan 
possible or recovering the grizzly bear. Even though this grassroots ef-
fort won the support of a great majority of the public and bi-partisan 
support from certain state leaders, this locally driven plan surprisingly 
failed to win the support of the Bush Administration despite the Presi-
dent's election promise to return federal decision-making to the hands of 
local leaders. 14 Why then did the grizzly bear plan fail? What does it 
mean for the future of the grizzly bear, other wildlife reintroductions, and 
the ESA itself? And, is there anything that can be done to force the Bush 
Administration's hand to take action on the grizzly bear CMC alterna-
tive? 
A. THE POLITICS BEHIND THE SCUTTLING OF THE GRIZZLY 
REINTRODUCTION PLAN 
Despite the lip-service paid to the need to increase local control, the 
Bush Administration has rapidly become the most centralized govern-
ment in recent American history with a great deal of power concentrated 
in the President and his cabinet level officials. When viewed under the 
guise of this political power structure, the rejection of the Clinton Ad-
ministration CMC policy likely had more to do with entrenched notions 
of federalism and power sharing than it had anything to do with a rejec-
tion of the grizzly proposal on its merits. While the President is over-
whelmingly perceived as a "state's rights" advocate, a more careful re-
view of his Administration's treatment of the grizzly bear plan indicates 
that actions over the past two years indicate that placing power in the 
hands of local decision makers is only supported by the Administration 
in limited circumstances. 
The rejection of the CMC grizzly reintroduction plan may have had 
more to do with the fact that the proposal did not initiate with the Bush 
Administration, than it did with a greater paradigm shift in the Admini-
stration's policy towards endangered species. While the Administra-
142 See supra note I. 
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tion's acquiescence to the demands of Idaho's Governor raises serious 
questions as to the independence of Federal agencies, the decision was 
simply an example of Washington party politics as usual supporting the 
wholesale abandonment of the previous Administration's policies as a 
matter of course rather than out of respect for the state's position or indi-
cating an abandonment of the ESA. Otherwise, a locally created and 
locally managed species reintroduction plan would seem to fit squarely 
into the Administration's modus operandi. 
The reactions of Idaho's political leaders are a little more difficult to 
understand. In a state that is home to many anti-Federal government 
factions, it would seem as though a plan developed by local citizens for 
local citizens would win overwhelming support - especially when the 
burden of the conservation fell squarely within federal land. 143 And such 
a plan did - among the local citizens. Although it may seem politically 
counter-intuitive that Idaho's elected leaders did not support the plan as 
well, the voices that supported reintroduction within the state do not 
curry political favor and lack the ability to mobilize against the predomi-
nately anti-species Idaho regime, as is aptly demonstrated by Idaho's 
continued resistance to the presence of gray wolves in the state. l44 The 
CMC had everything the wolf recovery plan, also rejected by the state, 
did not, including broad local citizen control and clear accountability. 
After years of fighting wolf recovery, however, the state of Idaho is now 
actively pursuing management of gray wolf after it is removed from the 
endangered species list in the next few years. The reason behind the 
sudden change of heart in the wolf context applies equally to the grizzly. 
Had the state of Idaho been the guiding force crafting the grizzly reintro-
duction plan and had more than a minority role to play on the CMC, the 
state may have supported the plan. Moreover, the CMC did not include 
the powerful special interests in the state, including the Idaho Cattle-
man's Association and ranching and hunting organizations, even though 
the Governor could have used his CMC appointments to effectuate this 
result. Thus, while the CMC had local control, it may have been the 
wrong local control to appease state decision-makers. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF SPECIES REINTRODUCTIONS UNDER 
THEESA 
Perhaps the biggest loser in the battle over grizzly bear reintroduc-
tion is the availability of future species reintroductions under the ESA, 
rather than the grizzly bear itself. 
143 See supra note 16. 
144 See supra note 134. 
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The nonessential experimental population provisions of the ESA 
were written broadly by Congress granting significant discretion to the 
Secretary to "authorize the release ... of any population .. .if the Secre-
tary determines that such release will further the conservation of the spe-
cies." 145 This determination is to be based on the "best available infor-
mation.,,146 By not using the term "best available science", which is 
found in other sections of the ESA, Congress likely intended to provide 
the Secretary with the ability to use all the information available to him, 
whether stemming from scientific data, commercial data, or other identi-
fiable and reliable sources to meet the conservation needs of the spe-
cies. 147 Like the listing requirements under the ESA, however, the Sec-
retary is still bound to view the experimental population designations as 
an impartial and objective inquiry, free of economic or other extraneous 
considerations. 148 The problem is simple: the terms "best available in-
formation" and "best available scientific data" are at best subjective. At 
worst, they highlight the fundamental weakness of the ESA, one that has 
long been exploited by environmental groups challenging the Secretary's 
failure to list species as threatened or endangered. From all the circum-
stances surrounding the decision to abandon the grizzly bear plan, it ap-
pears as though Secretary Norton has adopted the approach long used 
against her agency as a means of justifying her "no action" decision -
scientific uncertainty. 
The "best available politics does not equate to the best available sci-
ence.,,149 Yet, in the grizzly bear context, it was politics and not science 
that prevailed at the end of the day. This exact problem has been recog-
nized by Idaho Senator Michael Crapo who, when discussing pacific 
salmon recovery, stated: 
We must not fear good accurate science. Some worry where good ac-
curate science may lead us and as a result, many seek to manipulate 
scientific processes and mis-characterize scientific hypothesis and con-
clusions. Such activity is a disservice and can only bring further grid-
lock and severe penalties to the Pacific Northwest. I urge people from 
145 16 V.S.C. § I 539(j)(2)(A). (2002) 
146/d. § I 539(j)(2)(B). 
147 The term "best scientific data" is the standard for listing determinations under Section 4 
of the ESA. [d. § 1532(b)(I)(A). 
148 See H.R. Rep!. No. 97-567 PI. I, 97th Cog. 2d Sess. At 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
V.S.C.C.A.N. 2807,2820. 
149 Midwater Trawlers Co-Operative v. Dep't of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720 (9th Cir. 
2002) (discussing the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which like the ESA, requires NMFS to use the "best 
scientific information available" when making species protection decisions). 
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all perspectives to insist on good science and be willing to recognize it 
h fi d · 150 w en we n It. 
Until this occurs, the ESA and the programs and species that rely on its 
strength will remain at the mercy of the politically powerful and risk 
adverse. 
The problem is not with the language of the ESA. Far too often, 
stories emerge from Federal agencies where low-level scientists make a 
decision, based purely on the data before them, which is subsequently 
rejected by appointed bureaucrats within the agency because of the im-
plications of that scientific decision on land management and land use 
practices within the proposed reintroduction area. Unfortunately, insu-
lating science from politics and encouraging respect for the scientifically 
based agency decisions cannot be legislated by an act of Congress. Land 
use interests are already given leverage within Section 10 of the ESA that 
grants take permits and other hardship exemptions based on "substantial 
economic loss resulting from" ESA listings and species reintroduc-
tions. 151 Those potentially adversely affected by ESA actions must be 
encouraged to use existing ESA procedures to seek relief rather than 
using political means to influence the decision making process. One 
means to accomplish this end should include greater education and out-
reach from agency representatives about the realities of the ESA and 
species reintroduction plans. The opportunities for public hearings and 
comment periods secured under the Administrative Procedures Act can 
only go so far in dispelling the myths of the ESA. 152 Only through tar-
geted educational and outreach efforts in areas affected by species rein-
troduction can Federal agencies begin the long process of gaining broad 
acceptance for the ESA and the species it seeks to protect. 
However, species reintroduction under the ESA is not dead. In fact, 
a plan has resurfaced to reintroduce the grizzly bear, this time in the 
North Cascades of north central Washington State. 153 The North Cas-
cades is one of six grizzly bear recovery zones established after the bear 
was listed under the ESA in 1975, and is the last to undertake the neces-
sary environmental study required for grizzly recovery efforts to be-
gin. 154 Nevertheless, the reason for the decision to move forward with 
the plan is not based on the needs of the species, but rather on pragmatic 
ISO Statement of Senator Michael Crapo, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, Sept. 14,2000. 
151 16 U.S.C. § I 539(a)-(b) (2002). 
152 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 706. 
IS) Associated Press, Grizzly Reintroduction is Back on the Agenda, Lewiston Morning Trib-
une, Sept. 30,2002, at 6A (on file with Nez Perce Tribe Office of Legal Counsel in Lapwai, Idaho). 
IS4ld. 
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concerns over management authority caused by the possibility that Ca-
nadian grizzlies may wander into Washington if the Canadian govern-
ment proceeds with a plan to move grizzles into southern British Colum-
bia. IS A consultant group has been hired by the Department of the Inte-
rior to raise awareness of the plan and build grassroots support for the 
project. IS6 SO far though, "area farmers, business owners, recreation 
groups and political leaders" have rejected the idea of reintroducing the 
grizzly.IS7 In the early 1990s, the Washington Department of Fish and 
Wildlife and the state Senate publicly opposed the idea. IS8 
The North Cascades plan serves to highlight one major problem 
with the citizen management approach to species reintroduction - what 
happens if the public disagrees with the science that demands species 
reintroduction? While it is increasingly important to have local support 
for environmental decisions, science must not yield to public opinion in 
the same way it has yielded to political pressure. Environmentalists, in-
dustry representatives, and government leaders must seek consensus 
building. Should that process fail, however, the Federal government 
must not be afraid to carry out the mandate that Congress charged it with 
under the ESA. IS9 If we are only willing to use the ESA to save the char-
ismatic species that we will never have to come into contact with, biodi-
versity and all of us in the country are the losers. 
C. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR THE GRIZZLY BEAR AND THE BmERROOT 
REINTRODUCTION PLAN 
Fortunately, despite the rejection of the proposed Bitterroot reintro-
duction plan, two populations of grizzly bears remain in the continental 
United States. 160 The bad news is that the two genetically and geographi-
cally isolated populations become more imperiled by their separation 
each day.161 The Interior Secretary's decision to ignore the conclusions 
of her own agency that the long-term survival of the grizzly requires their 
recovery over a broader geographical area than they currently populate 
and to disregard the government's own twenty-seven year-old plan for 
ISS Id. 
IS6Id. 
IS7Id. 
IS8/d. 
159 Congress declared it to be the policy of the United States and one of the purposes of the 
ESA to "encourage[ ] the States and other interested parties ... to develop and maintain conservation 
programs which meet national and international standards [as] key to meeting the Nation's interna-
tional commitments and to better safeguard[ ], for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation's heritage in 
fish, wildlife, and pants." 16 U.S.C. § IS31(a)(S). 
160 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
161 /d.; see supra note 21. 
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recovering the species, however, may not signal the death knell for the 
species or the reintroduction plan. 
The Final Rule proposing the reintroduction of grizzlies into the Bit-
terroot Ecosystem remains in a state of political and legal limbo. As of 
the writing of this article, almost a year and a half after the scuttling of 
the reintroduction plan, Secretary Norton has still not acted on the public 
comment received in response to her notice of intent to select the "no 
action" alternative. This may prove to be a blessing in disguise. 
The potential for a lawsuit exists under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (AP A), 162 with additional claims under the ESA to force the 
Interior Secretary to take action on the grizzly bear plan and reinstate the 
proposed action to reintroduce the bears under the management of the 
CMC. 163 In particular, a lawsuit brought by a local citizen in the recov-
ery area or one of the stakeholders in the CMC plan,164 could seek to 
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. 165 
While the successful resolution of such a suit can only result in a court 
order compelling the FWS to make a final decision on whether the adopt 
the Final Rule or the "no action" alternative, the addition of a claim seek-
ing declaratory relief under the ESA could push the Court to find that the 
Interior Secretary violated the mandate of the ESA when she rejected the 
proposed reintroduction without any scientific evidence to do SO.166 
Should the Secretary be adjudicated to have acted arbitrarily and capri-
162 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2002). 
16J Considering the hostile response such a lawsuit may receive in the press and in Congress, 
and the political realities of the courts today, it is not surprising that a lawsuit has not yet been filed 
to force the Secretary's hand. 
164 The class of potential plaintiffs is so limited due to the requirements of constitutional and 
prudential standing. In addition to the Article III constitutional elements of standing (injury in fact, 
causation and redressability), the APA limits standing to "[a] person suffering a legal wrong because 
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by a [final] agency action within the meaning of 
a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof." Id. § 702. 
165 Such an action would be based on Section 706 of the AP A. That section reads, in rele-
vant part, "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall ... (I) 
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (a) arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; ... (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right .... Id. § 706(1)-(2). 
166 The ESA claim could be based on Section 4(d) which requires the Secretary to "issue 
such regulations as he deems necessary" to provide for the conservation of threatened species. 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(d). Section 7(a)(I) further requires the Secretary to use his authority to carry out 
programs for the "conservation" of listed species. Id. § 1536(a)(I). In light of these mandates, the 
scientific evidence contained in the EIS and ROD, and the "plain language of the Act, buttressed by 
its legislative history [that] shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as 
incalculable", such an action should succeed. TVA, 437 U.S. at 176. Generally, courts "reject 
conclusory analysis" like that contained in the Secretary's notice of intent "where the agency spurns 
unrebutted expert opinions without itself offering a credible alternative explanation." American 
Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldrige, 738 F.2d \0\3,1016 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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ciously and without accordance of law,167 the notice of intent to pursue 
the "no action" alternative would have to be withdrawn and a new action 
proposed in its place. 168 Together, a successful action on both claims for 
relief could open the door to eventual adoption of the CMC Bitterroot 
grizzly reintroduction plan. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the plan to reintroduce a small number of grizzly bears 
into the Bitterroot Ecosystem was dealt a major set back in 2001, the 
reintroduction plan may very well be resurrected with the next change of 
tenancy at the White House. The bears, however, may not wait that long. 
With grizzly bear populations slowly expanding to the north and east of 
the Bitterroot Ecosystem, it is just a matter of time until one of these 
majestic creatures makes its way into Idaho on its own. When the griz-
zly does return to its historic habitat it may not be under conditions 
nearly as favorable to or controllable by local governments as those that 
were offered under the CMC plan. 
Much like the eventual spread of the grizzly bear across the West, 
the desire of people to conserve threatened and endangered species can-
not be stilted forever, and neither can the desire of people to work to-
gether to craft creative, grassroots solutions to the Federal bureaucratic 
delays that too often come at the expense of the species sought to be pro-
tected. While the CMC approach was a first of a kind method for deal-
ing with species reintroduction, it will not be the last. 
The future of the ESA and species recovery must be built on mutual 
trust and cooperation between local citizens, organizations, governments 
and federal agencies. The flexibility inherent in a system designed and 
managed by those most closely connected to the species and on-the-
ground concerns make the CMC concept worthy of emulation throughout 
the United States. Now, it is up to our leaders in Washington, D.C. to get 
the message. Regardless of the outcome of this particular effort at griz-
zly bear reintroduction, the most important aspect of the collaborative 
grizzly bear recovery process will not be the tone it sets for future spe-
cies reintroductions under the ESA. Rather, the lasting benefit will be 
167 The arbitrary and capricious standard is highly deferential to the agency, requiring the 
court to uphold a decision "so long as the agency gave at least minimal consideration to the relevant 
facts contained in the record." American Petroleum Ins!. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 661 
F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981). However, as noted above, the Secretary's decision to abandon the reintro-
duction plan was devoid of supporting evidence and clearly ignored the ROD issued with the Final 
Rule. Even under this highly deferential standard, a court would likely find that the Secretary's 
actions were not based on the record and were conducted without observance of the requirements of 
the ESA. 
168 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
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the more open and hospitable social environment these bears will step 
into when they finally cross into the wilds of Idaho. 
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